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One advantage cited for formal inflation targeting is that by anchoring inflationary
expectations this policy framework would aid in the pricing of long-term securities.
Long-term interest rates would become less sensitive to temporary shocks to the
economy including policy-induced changes in short-term interest rates. This paper
examines the experience in this regard of New Zealand and Australia, two countries
that have been inflation targeters for many years. Our results are consistent with
inflationary expectations having become more firmly anchored after the move
to inflation targeting in each country. There is no evidence that the credibility of the
inflation-targeting regime in either country weakened during the recent world
financial crisis.
Keywords: inflation targeting; monetary policy; long-term interest rate
1. Introduction
One often-cited advantage of inflation targeting is that ‘with long-term inflationary
expectations more firmly anchored, long-term interest rates might jump around a bit less,
and businesses and investors might find it easier to draw up long-term contracts’.1 With
long-term inflationary expectations anchored by a credible inflation-targeting regime,
rates would respond by less to temporary shocks to the economy including policy-induced
changes in short-term interest rates. Australia and New Zealand adopted inflation-target-
ing regimes in 1994 and 1990, respectively. Here, we examine their experience to see if
the above predictions are borne out.
The link between the response of long-term interest rates to changes in monetary pol-
icy and the anchoring of inflationary expectations has been an element in the debate in
the United States over moving toward an inflation-targeting framework. Ben Bernanke
has argued that, ‘the apparently high sensitivity of long-term nominal interest rates to Fed
actions suggests some uncertainty about the Fed’s long-run inflation target’.2
More broadly, the study of the effects of monetary policy rates on long-term rates
under inflation-targeting regimes is of interest for the question of whether inflation target-
ing matters. Studies such as Ball and Sheridan (2005), Ball (2011), Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2007), Dueker and Fischer (2006), and Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004)
suggest answers ranging from ‘IT (inflation targeting) has played a role in anchoring
inflationary expectations and in reducing inflation persistence’ (Levin et al., 2004) to
‘thus on the heels of a decade of low global inflation, it has been hard to argue that formal
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inflation targets have led to any divergence between targeters and non-targeters in terms
of inflation performance’ (Dueker & Fischer, 2006).
The experience of New Zealand and Australia is of interest from several additional
perspectives. New Zealand was regarded, at least for many years, as the strictest infla-
tion-targeting nation. Australia was viewed as having, as Dueker and Fischer (2006) term
it, ‘a more nebulous charge to keep inflation at levels comparable with those of its major
trading partners’ (pp. 440441).3 Our estimates provide evidence on whether any differ-
ences in the targeting regimes had discernible effects on the relationship of long-term
rates to the policy rate. Additionally, with regard to procedures, in April of 1999, the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand shifted from an operating target of cash settlement balan-
ces to control of the overnight interbank cash rate. We examine whether this shift altered
the relationship between monetary policy actions and long-term interest rates. Finally, the
fact that the monetary policy rate in Australia and New Zealand has been unconstrained
by the zero lower bound, allows us to extend the analysis to examine whether the world
financial crisis in 2008 weakened the credibility of the inflation-targeting regime in each
country as measured by the response of long-term rates to the policy rate.
To highlight a central conclusion, our statistical results indicate that the responses of
longer term interest rates to changes in monetary policy rates declined in Australia and
New Zealand following the introduction of inflation targeting  an indication that infla-
tionary expectation became better anchored. Comparisons to the United States, a non-
inflation targeter, do not show that these responses were smaller for the two inflation-tar-
geting countries, as might be expected if inflationary expectations were better anchored.
Our results are consistent with inflation-targeting regimes in Australia and New Zealand
having resulted in inflationary expectations as well anchored as in the United States com-
pared to less stable pre-inflation-targeting regimes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the inflation-target-
ing regimes and variances of long-term interest rates in the two countries. Section 3
examines evidence from vector auto regressions (VARs). We test whether there were
structural shifts in the coefficients in estimated VARs pre- versus post-adoption of infla-
tion targeting in Australia and New Zealand. Also pre- and post-adoption of inflation tar-
geting, we examine the effects on longer term interest rates from innovations in the
policy rate in these countries as measured by impulse response functions. In Section 4,
we use data from the days on which the central banks in Australia and New Zealand
changed their policy rates to assess the effects of unanticipated changes in the policy rate
on longer term interest rates. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background and descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the variance of 5- and 10-year government security rates for New Zealand
and Australia. Data are monthly and variances are for selected time periods before and
after the adoption of inflation targeting in each country.4
For New Zealand, the pre-inflation-targeting period is April 1985January 1990
(Panel A; line 1). This is the period from the floating of the New Zealand dollar to the
effective date of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act in February 1990, the beginning
of formal inflation targeting. The period of inflation targeting is February 1990 to October
2012 (line 2). Statistics are also shown for several subperiods. The variance of both inter-
est rates is lower in all the inflation-targeting periods relative to the pre-inflation-targeting
period. The decline is greater for the inflation-targeting period cut-off in August 2008 just
before the start of the world financial crisis.5 Including the very low interest rate years
































that followed raises the variance. The Reserve Bank shifted from an operating target of
cash settlement balances to control of the overnight interbank cash rate in April 1999.
This change in operating procedures resulted in increased transparency.6 Subperiods start-
ing in April 1999 show markedly lower interest rate variances relative to the pre-inflation-
targeting period.
As can be seen from Table 1 (as indicated by asterisks), a test of the equality of the
variance of either interest rate in any of the inflation-targeting periods with that for the
pre-inflation-targeting period rejects equality at least at the 0.10 level of significance, for
many rates and periods at the 0.01 level.
Inflation targeting in Australia dates to Reserve Bank Governor Fraser’s statement of
26 September 1994. Thus, for our comparison of variances of Australian interest rates
pre-and post-adoption of inflation targeting (Panel B), we compare the period April
1985September 1994 (line 1) to October 1994October 2012 (line 2) as well as to the
shorter period October 1994August 2008 (line 3). For either of these inflation-targeting
periods, the variance of the 5- and 10-year interest rate was substantially lower relative to
the pre-inflation-targeting period. The hypothesis that the variance of either of the interest
rates in either inflation-targeting period was equal to that in the pre-inflation-targeting
period is rejected at the 0.01 level of significance.
The post-1990 period up until the world financial crisis was quite stable which may
account for lower volatility in interest rates. Table 2 shows the variance of 10-year interest
rates in seven OECD countries including New Zealand and Australia for April
1985December 1995 compared to two later periods: January 1996October 2012 and
January 1996August 2008. The variance of 10-year interest rates in all the countries in
the table was lower for the later period when it ends in August 2008. With the later period
extended to 2012, the results were mixed. It is also the case that the inflation-targeting coun-
tries in the comparison group do not show markedly greater declines than the United States.
Table 1. Variance of 5-year and 10-year interest rates, selected periods.a
Panel A: New Zealand
5 year 10 year
April 1985January 1990 5.72 4.12
February 1990October 2012 3.70 3.13
February 1990August2008 2.69 2.64
April 1999October 2012 1.11 0.64
April 1999August 2008 0.26 0.20
Panel B: Australia
5 year 10 year
April 1985September 1994 7.56 5.51
October 1994October 2012 1.93 1.90
October 1994August 2008 1.55 1.67
aFor Panels A and B, a two-tailed test for the equality of the variance of each interest rate for the particular infla-
tion-targeting period versus the pre-inflation-targeting period is conducted. To save space, the test statistics are
not reported but asterisks () are included to indicate whether post-IT period variances differ significantly from
those for the pre-IT period. A rejection of equality is indicated at the 1% level by (), at the 5% level by (),
and at the 10% level by ().
































The proportionate decline in the variance of the 10-year rate is largest for New Zealand
and Australia for both breaks in the sample. Comparing 19851995 with 19962012,
New Zealand and Australia go from having the highest variance of 10-year rate to the low-
est variance with the exception of Switzerland.7 Thus, the decline in volatility of interest
rates in New Zealand and Australia does not appear to be due solely to world economic
conditions. These two countries with high interest rate volatility converged to the less vol-
atile countries whether the latter were inflation targeters or not.
3. VAR analysis
This section examines the implications of estimated VARs for effects on longer term
interest rates resulting from innovations in monetary policy rates for Australia and New
Zealand. We check for evidence of structural shifts in the coefficients of the estimated
VARs following the adoption of inflation targeting in each country. We then examine
effects on longer term rates from innovations in the policy rates as well as other macro-
economic shocks in these countries as measured by impulse response functions.
The relationship of these VAR estimates to the questions raised in the introduction is
the following: if inflation targeting better anchors long-term inflationary expectations,
innovations in the overnight cash rate should have less effect on the average of expected
future short rates and thus on long-term rates. Thus, the volatility of long-term rates will
be reduced. With better anchored inflationary expectations, long-term rates should also
be less responsive to the nominal component of innovations in other macroeconomic vari-
ables.8 Thus, the expectation is that if inflation targeting has better anchored inflationary
expectations, we will observe statistically significant changes in the parameters of esti-
mated VARs following the adoption of this policy regime. Most directly, we expect
changes in impulse responses showing the effect on long-term rates from innovations in
the monetary policy rate.9
3.1. Details of the VARs
3.1.1. Data and specification
The VARs for Australia and New Zealand each contain four variables: the overnight cash
rate, a longer term interest rate (2 year, 5 year or 10 year), the exchange rate (value of the
Australian or New Zealand dollar in US dollars), and an index of Australian or New
Zealand commodity prices, measured in home currency (July 1986 D 100).10 Interest
rates are measured in percent. The exchange rate and commodity price variables are







Australia 5.39 1.04 0.74
New Zealand 13.50 0.89 0.46
Canada 1.13 1.58 0.93
Sweden 2.45 2.30 1.55
Switzerland 0.86 0.75 0.32
United Kingdom 1.72 1.78 1.06
United States 1.54 1.63 0.81
































entered as logarithmic first differences. The sample period runs from April 1985 to
October 2012. Selected subsamples are also examined. Observations are monthly.
Monthly dummy variables were included to account for seasonality.
3.1.2. Tests for unit roots and co-integration
Tests for unit roots were conducted on each data series. The tests were: the augmented
DickeyFuller test, ElliottRothenbergStock-DF-GLS test, PhillipsPerron test, and
KwiatkowskiPhillipSchmidtShin (KPSS) test. The null is presence of a unit root for
the first three tests. The null is stationarity for the last test.
For New Zealand, for the logarithmic first difference of the exchange rate and com-
modity price series, the presence of a unit root is rejected, generally at the 0.01 level, by
the first three tests in the sample period and all subsamples that we use. The null of statio-
narity is never rejected by the fourth (KPSS) test. We therefore assume these series are
stationary.
The situation is less clear cut for the interest rate series (policy rate: 2-year, 5-year,
and 10-year rates). The presence of a unit root cannot be rejected for at least two out of
three unit root tests that we employ for all interest rates for all samples that we consider.
For all samples, the null of stationarity is rejected by the KPSS test at least at the 0.10
level. Given the stronger support for the presence of a unit root we assume this to be the
case.
For Australia, for log first differences of the exchange rate and commodity price
series, a unit root is rejected at the 0.01 level by each of our three tests for all sample peri-
ods. Stationarity is not rejected by the KPSS test for any sample period. These series
appear to be stationary. In the case of the interest rate series, for the inflation-targeting
period a unit root is rejected in about 50% of the tests (three tests each across the four
interest rates). Pre-inflation targeting a unit root is not rejected by any of our three tests
for any interest rate. Stationarity is, however, rejected by the KPSS test in all sample peri-
ods. Thus, the presence of a unit root must be considered as a possibility for the interest
rate series.11
Because some of the series may contain unit roots, we test for co-integration. Table 3
reports the Johansen co-integration test results for the null that there are no co-integrating
vectors. The reported p-values in the table indicate clear rejection of the null of no co-
integration at the 0.01 level for all samples and all interest rates in New Zealand and Aus-
tralia. This is consistent with a co-integrating vector between the two possibly non-sta-
tionary variables  the interest rates in each of our VARs. Sims, Stock, and Watson
(1990) and Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) argue that if part of a system consists of series
that contain unit roots but the system is co-integrated, as appears to be the case with our
data, VAR estimates will be consistent.
3.1.3. Tests for structural breaks
If the move to inflation targeting caused long-term interest rates to become less sensitive
to changes in the monetary policy rate as well as other shocks, we would expect the coef-
ficients in the VARs we estimate to differ pre- and post-adoption of inflation targeting.
To test for this, we perform several of Chow’s structural break tests.12 The results are
shown in Table 4 for Australia and New Zealand. The tests are for a structural break pre-
and post-adoption of inflation targeting in each country. For New Zealand, we also test
for a structural break within the inflation-targeting period when the Reserve Bank
































switched from cash settlement balances to the overnight interbank cash rate as an operat-
ing target in April 1999. For each test, there are two VARs: one where the long-term
interest rate is the 5-year rate and one with the 10-year rate. The table shows the signifi-
cance level (p-value) for a break between the two periods in the test.
The first test is for a structural break in the multi-equation VAR system (the first col-
umn). For each break point, evidence of a structural break is strong (p-value 0.000).
Table 3. Co-integration tests.a
New Zealand Australia
Int. rate Test stat. p-value Int. rate Test stat. p-value
April 1985October 2012 April 1985October 2012
2 year 224.3703 0.0001 2 year 266.7206 0.0001
5 year 210.5875 0 5 year 270.8262 0.0001
10 year 199.1738 0 10 year 257.8049 0.0001
April 1985January 1990 April 1985September 1994
2 year 110.8073 0
5 year 104.2254 0 5 year 99.7176 0
10 year 102.2347 0 10 year 93.32081 0
February 1990October 2012 October 1994October 2012
2 year 167.5752 0 2 year 266.7206 0.0001
5 year 156.6077 0 5 year 238.1483 0.0001
10 year 149.1558 0 10 year 235.9661 0.0001
February 1990March 1999
2 year 99.23902 0
5 year 97.29524 0
10 year 95.81661 0
April 1999October 2012
2 year 134.3311 0
5 year 127.2561 0
10 year 127.1266 0
aJohansen co-integration test for the null of zero co-integrating vectors.
Table 4. Structural break tests.a
System Long rate Policy rate
Country Break F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
Australia October 1994 5 year 518.7485 0.0000 8.1012 0.0000 2.6313 0.0004
10 year 535.5599 0.0000 1.1835 0.2739 2.4458 0.0012
New Zealand February 1990 5 year 255.5497 0.0000 2.1975 0.0042 7.6601 0.0000
10 year 242.5473 0.0000 2.0220 0.0097 8.0134 0.0000
New Zealand April 1999b 5 year 306.5292 0.0000 1.5846 0.0664 1.5195 0.0857
10 year 302.7227 0.0000 1.5485 0.0765 1.4623 0.1064
aCells in the table are the F-statistics and p-values giving the marginal significance level from a Chow test for the
equality between sets of coefficients from two multi-equation VARs or two single-equation linear regressions.
bSample starts in February 1990 rather than April 1985 as in the other samples.
































The other two tests are for changes in the coefficients in individual equations in the
VAR. The first is for the equation for the long-term rate in each VAR (the second col-
umn). For Australia, the test shows evidence of a significant break for the equation for the
5-year but not for the 10-year rate. For New Zealand, there is evidence of a significant
break at the 0.01 level pre- and post-inflation targeting for both long-term rates. For the
break in New Zealand, at the date of the change in operating target, the test indicating a
break is significant only at the 0.10 level for the 5- and 10-year rate equations.
The second single equation test is for the policy rate equation in each country (the
third column). The Chow test indicates a break at the 0.01 level in both countries pre- ver-
sus post- adoption of inflation targeting for VARs containing either the 5-year or 10-year
interest rates. There is a weaker evidence of a break for New Zealand with the change in
operating target in 1999.
The test statistics in Table 4 suggest significant changes in the coefficients in VARs
pre-and post-adoption of inflation targeting in both Australia and New Zealand.
3.2. Impulse response functions
Impulse response functions are computed using the method of Pesaran and Shin (1998) to
identify the shocks in the VAR. These generalized impulse response functions are insensi-
tive to the ordering of the variables. For the VARs, the lag length chosen by the Bayesian
information criterion is 1.13 The impulse responses are to a one-percentage point change
in the level of an interest rate or one percent change in the exchange rate or commodity
price index. In the figures, the impulse response function is the solid line; dotted lines
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Response of CPI to CPI
Figure 1. Impulse response functions: New Zealand, 5-year rate, February 1990October 2012.
































Representative impulse response functions for New Zealand and Australia are shown in
Figures 1 and 2. For each country, the VAR is estimated from the beginning of inflation tar-
geting to October 2012. Thus, the starting point for New Zealand is February 1990 and
October 1994 for Australia. In each figure, the long-term interest rate is the 5-year rate. Out
interest is primarily in the response of the longer term interest rates to the policy rate  the
row 2column 1 cell of each panel. Thus, for other sample periods and maturities we show
only that panel.
Some comments on the complete set of impulse response functions as shown in Figures 1
and 2 are merited. For New Zealand (Figure 1), the effects of a one-percentage point shock
in policy rate (interbank rate) on the exchange rate and commodity price measures are
short-lived. In the case of the exchange rate, the effect of the interbank rate is negative but
insignificant.15 The commodity price index responds positively but briefly and with
marginal significance.16 With respect to the main variable of interest, Figure 1 shows that
the 5-year interest rate rises initially by 0.10 percentage points in response to a one percent-
age point increase in the interbank rate. The 5-year rate returns to its initial level after
approximately 15 months; the response is significant for approximately six months. Impulse
response functions for Australia are shown in Figure 2. The pattern is similar to that for
New Zealand. The initial response of the 5-year rate to the policy rate is smaller, approxi-
mately 0.05 percentage points per one percentage point. The response dies out after approxi-
mately 12 months (significant for 5 months).
Two features of these impulse responses are of interest. First, the interbank rate pro-
cess shows considerable persistence (the 1 £ 1 panel of each figure). Second, there is a
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Response of CPI to CPI
Figure 2. Impulse response functions: Australia, 5-year rate, October 1994October 2012.








































































































































































2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Figure 3. Impulse response functions: market rates to OCR: selected time periods, New Zealand.




























































































2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Figure 4. Impulse response functions: market rates to interbank rate: selected time periods for
Australia.
Note: Data for the 2-year interest rate does not go far enough back to estimate the VAR for the pre-
inflation-targeting period. Thus, the 1 £ 1 cell in the figure is blank.
































3.3. Effects on long-term rates of shocks to the policy rate
Figures 3 and 4 show impulse response functions for several time periods for 2-, 5-, and
10-year interest rates.
3.3.1. New Zealand
For New Zealand, in addition to the 19902012 period in Figure 1, Figure 3 shows
impulse responses for the pre-inflation-targeting period (April 1985January 1990), for
the period of inflation targeting after the adoption of the overnight cash rate as the short-
run operating target (April 1999October 2012) and a period (February 1990August
2008) that ends with the onset of the world financial crisis.
The impulse response functions reveal two patterns. First, moving across a row of the
figure, we see that as the term to maturity increases (from 2 to 5 to 10 years) the response
of the interest rate to a one-percentage point shock to the policy rate declines. Second, for
the first three rows, as we look down a column (going from pre-IT to the whole IT period
to post-1999), the response of longer term interest rates to a shock declines at each matu-
rity. In the case of the 5-year rate, for example, the (initial) response to a one-percentage
point change in the policy rate is approximately: 0.25 percentage points pre-inflation tar-
geting; 0.10 percentage points for the February 1990October 2012 period; and 0.05 per-
centage points for the April 1999October 2012 period (following the change in
operating procedure).
The last row of Figure 3 shows the result of cutting the inflation-targeting sample off
in August 2008 to exclude the world financial crisis and recession. The impulse response
functions do not indicate a substantial change in the magnitude of the responses of longer
term interest rates to a change in the policy rate.
3.3.2. Australia
Figure 4 shows responses of three longer term interest rates to a one-percentage point shock
in the policy (interbank) rate in Australia. The panels in the first two rows of the figure
compare periods before (April 1985September 1994) and after (October 1994October
2012) the adoption of inflation targeting. The pattern is similar to that for New Zealand.
The response of longer term interest rates to the policy rate declines with term to maturity
and is markedly smaller post-adoption of inflation targeting.17 The panels in the third row
of the figure show impulse responses where the inflation-targeting period is cut off at the
start of the world financial crisis in fall 2008. This has no discernible effect on the magni-
tude of the responses of long-term interest rates to changes in the policy rate.
A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 indicates that for the inflation-targeting periods the
responses of longer term interest rates to the monetary policy rate in the two countries
were of roughly the same magnitude and duration, with the responses for Australia
slightly smaller.
3.4. Comparison to previous US VAR analysis
How do the impulse response functions in this section compare with impulse response
functions from previous studies for the United States, a non-inflation-targeting country?
Summarizing the US results Evans and Marshall (1998) state, ‘A contractionary policy
shock induces a pronounced but short-lived response of short-term rates. The response
declines monotonically with maturity; long-term rates are virtually unaffected.’ An
































additional finding from VAR analysis for the United States is that the estimated responses
of long-term interest rates to innovations in the federal funds rate are lower for the post-
1987 period relative to pre-1979 and still lower for the post-1994 years (Berument &
Froyen, 2006, 2009). The Federal Reserve’s greater emphasis on inflation post-1979 and
greater transparency in the 1990s are possible reasons for this decline, reflecting greater
anchoring of inflationary expectations. Overall, VAR estimates do not show larger
responses of long-term interest rates to the innovations in the policy rate in the United
States relative to Australia or New Zealand.18
4. Effects of policy rate surprises
In this section, an alternative method is used to examine the effects that unanticipated
changes in monetary policy rates have on longer term rates.
4.1. Measuring policy rate surprises for New Zealand and Australia
To study the effect of unanticipated (or surprise) changes in monetary policy rates, a
method is needed to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated actions. For
United States monetary policy Kuttner (2001) used data from the federal funds futures
market to measure market anticipations of policy actions. An equivalent futures market
does not exist for New Zealand. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) and Ellingsen, S€oderstr€om,
and Masseng (2004) measure the unanticipated (or surprise) component of a policy action
as the change in a 30-day interest rate from just before to just after the change in the pol-
icy rate. We follow this approach for New Zealand and Australia.19 The logic motivating
this measure is that the 30-day rate, which reflects expectations of overnight rates for the
next 30 days and a term premium, will change with only the unanticipated component of
changes in the policy rate.
Reserve Bank of New Zealand policy actions are announced in the morning before
financial markets open.20 Therefore, we measure the surprise component of a change in
the Reserve Bank’s official cash rate (OCR) (DRU) by the change in the 30-day rate on
the day (t) of the policy announcement (day(t)  day(t  1)).21 We then regress the
change in each of the longer term rates (DRL) on this measure of the policy surprise.
The same procedure is used to measure policy rate surprises for Australia. The timing is
the same: the change in the 30-day rate on the day of the policy announcement from the
previous day because the Reserve Bank announces a change well before the close of the
market.
Thus, for both countries we estimate
DRLt D aþ bDRUt þ et: (1)
Results are shown in Table 5.
4.2. Estimates for New Zealand
Estimates for New Zealand are shown in panel A of Table 5. The estimates in column 1
are for the sample period April 1999August 2013, the whole period during which the
official cash rate was the operating target. The sample period for the estimates in column
2 also starts in April 1999 but ends in August 2008.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From the estimates in the first column of the table, it can be seen that for the whole
sample, an unanticipated one-percentage point change in OCR (as measured by the same
day change in the 30-day rate) changes longer term rates by an amount that declines
monotonically with term to maturity. The effect ranges from 0.832 percentage points for
the 1-year rate to 0.438 percentage points for the 5-year rate to 0.249 percentage points
for the 10-year rate.
The estimates in column 2 of Table 5 for the sample truncated at the start of the finan-
cial crisis, show effects on longer term interest rates that differ only slightly from those in
the whole sample. The estimated effect of an unanticipated one-percentage point change
in OCR on the 10-year rate, for example, is 0.229 percentage points compared to 0.249
for the whole sample, approximately 2 basis points.
4.3. Estimates for Australia
Panel B of Table 5 shows estimated effects on longer term interest rates from unantici-
pated changes in the Australian policy rate. The sample in the first column is April
1999August 2013. The estimate in the second column is for a sample with the same
starting point but ending in August 2008.22
As with the estimates for New Zealand, an unanticipated one-percentage point change
in the policy rate has an estimated effect on longer term rates that declines with term to
maturity. For the longer sample period, the effect ranges from 0.828 for the 1-year rate to
0.349 for the 5-year rate to 0.138 for the 10-year rate. For the sample truncated in August
2008, these effects are only slightly lower (if statistically significant).
4.4. Implications for the anchoring of inflationary expectations
The estimates in Table 5 indicate that unanticipated changes in policy rate in New Zea-
land and Australia have statistically significant effects on longer term rates that decline
monotonically with term to maturity.23 While substantial, these effects do not appear
inconsistent with inflationary expectations being well anchored in the two countries. As
can be seen from the impulse responses in Figures 1 and 2 (column 1row 1), innovations
Table 6. Data Sources.
Data sources The sources and descriptions of the data series used in the paper are as follows:
Australia Bond rates are secondary market government bond yields. The 30-day and 90-day
rates are the rates on Reserve Bank bills. The policy rate is the overnight
interbank rate. All are taken from the Reserve Bank of Australia’s data bank.
New Zealand Bond rates are secondary market government bond yields. The 30-day and 90-day
rates are the rates on Reserve Bank bills. The policy rate is the overnight
interbank cash rate. The exchange rate is the value of the New Zealand dollar in
US cents. All series are from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The commodity
price measure is an index of New Zealand import and export prices, measured in
New Zealand dollars (1986  100). The source is ANZ Bank.
United States Data for all Treasury securities are constant maturity rates. The policy rate is the
effective federal funds rate. The data source is FRED, the database of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Other countries Data for interest rates for countries other than Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States (Table 2) are taken from the IMFIFS data bank.
































in the policy rate exhibit a high degree of persistence in both countries. A surprise change
in the policy rate would rationally be expected to persist increasing the impact on longer
term rates.
The estimates in Table 5 and the impulse response functions in the previous section
also bear on the question raised in the introduction of whether differences in inflation-tar-
geting procedures in Australia and New Zealand had discernible effects on the response
of long-term interest rates to monetary policy actions in the two countries. Early on the
New Zealand regime was quite strict. The policy target agreement specified that the goal
was a ‘stable general level of prices’ with an annual rise in the CPI of 0% to 2%.
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) wrote that ‘in contrast to New Zealand’s
targeting framework . . . the Reserve Bank of Australia emphasized flexibility in all
aspects of its operations from the definition of the target to recognition of its discretion in
responding to shocks’ (p. 223). Over time, however, there was convergence in the proce-
dures of the two central banks. Currently, the New Zealand policy targets agreement
specifies a target rate of inflation of 1%3% over the medium term while Australia has
‘an inflation target and seeks to keep consumer price inflation in the economy to 2%3%
on an average over the medium term’.
A comparison to the effects of surprise changes of the United States policy rate pro-
vides an additional perspective. Panel C of Table 5 shows estimated effects on longer
term interest rates of an unanticipated change in the United States federal funds target
rate. The unanticipated change in the federal funds target rate is measured in the same
way as for Australia and New Zealand, by the same day effect of the target rate change
on the 30-day bill rate.24 As can be seen from the table, the effects on longer term rates
were lower in the United States than in Australia or New Zealand with the exception of
the effect on the 10-year rate relative to that in Australia.25
The results in Table 5 appear consistent with well-anchored inflationary expectations
in Australia and New Zealand over the period up to and continuing through the recent
world financial crisis. The estimates do not provide evidence of better anchoring of infla-
tionary expectations in New Zealand and Australia relative to the United States, a non-
inflation-targeting country, but one with a record of low and stable inflation over the years
considered.
5. Conclusion
This paper examines evidence from Australia and New Zealand on whether inflation tar-
geting lessened the response of long-term interest rates to shocks to the monetary policy
rate, thus reducing the volatility of these rates. The summary statistics in Section 2 show
that the variance of longer term market interest rates declined sharply in both countries
after their move to inflation targeting (at different points) in the 1990s.
Estimated VARs for the two countries show evidence of significant shifts in their
coefficients pre- and post-adoption of inflation targeting. The impulse response functions
presented in Section 3 indicate that estimated responses of longer term interest rates to
innovations in the New Zealand and Australia policy rates declined following the intro-
duction of inflation targeting, a finding consistent with long-term inflation expectations
being more firmly anchored under inflation targeting. For New Zealand, these estimated
responses decline further for the 19992012 period following a shift in the operating tar-
get from cash settlement balances to the interbank interest rate (OCR) in April 1999.
Greater transparency resulting from the change is a plausible explanation for the change
exhibited in the impulse response functions.
































In Section 4, we examined the same day effect of unanticipated changes in the New
Zealand and Australian policy rates. The estimated effects shown in Table 5 indicate that
in both countries surprise changes in the policy rates have significant effects on longer
term rates that decline monotonically with term to maturity. These effects while substan-
tial do not seem inconsistent with inflationary expectations being well anchored in the
two countries, given the persistence in the pattern of changes in the policy rate.
Impulse response functions (Figures 3 and 4) and the same-day effects of unantici-
pated changes in policy rates (Table 5) were also estimated for both the countries for a
sample period truncated at the beginning of the financial crisis in fall 2008. These esti-
mates differed very little from those for the full sample. There was a little indication of a
weakened credibility of these inflation-targeting regimes during and after the crisis.
With respect to cross-country comparisons, overall our results do not indicate that at
times stricter inflation-targeting regime in New Zealand relative to Australia has resulted
in better anchored inflationary expectations. This may reflect a convergence in the
regimes over the whole of our sample. The other cross-country comparisons have been
made between the United States and the two inflation-targeting countries. Comparisons
of the effects on longer term rates from unanticipated changes in monetary policy rates,
whether measured from impulse response functions (Figures 3 and 4 compared to previ-
ous estimates for the United States) or same-day effects (Table 5, Panels A and B com-
pared to Panel C), do not show smaller effects for the inflation-targeting countries, as
might be expected had inflationary expectations been better anchored. Our results are,
however, consistent with inflation-targeting regimes in Australia and New Zealand having
resulted in inflationary expectations as well anchored as in the United States  a substan-
tial change from less stable pre-inflation-targeting regimes.
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Notes
1. Rogoff, Kenneth. (2005, April 23). A case for inflation transparency. Financial Times, p. 13.
2. Bernanke (2004, p. 166). Bernanke cites Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) for empirical
evidence that under current Federal Reserve procedures, ‘private agents’ views of long-run
inflation are not strongly anchored’ (p. 425). English, Lopez-Salido, and Tetlow (2013)
describe the Federal Reserve’s subsequent move toward ‘flexible inflation targeting’.
3. See also Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 223). There has been convergence in the interpretation of
inflation targeting in New Zealand and Australia. By 2002, the Reserve Bank of New Zea-
land’s Policy Targets Agreement specified the inflation target range as ‘1% to 3% over the
medium term’. We will return to this question of convergence in procedures at a later point.
4. Data descriptions and sources are given in Table 6.
5. Here we date the beginning of the crisis with the Lehmann Brothers bankruptcy and AIG bail-
out in September of 2008. There was certainly stress in financial markets prior to this.
6. On the operation of Reserve Bank policy in the pre-2000 period of inflation targeting, see
Guthrie and Wright (2000). Guender and Wu (2010) provide evidence that the change in oper-
ating procedure in 1999 increased the predictability and decreased the volatility of New Zea-
land interest rates at maturities out to 180 days.
7. We have also broken the sample period at the points where IT countries have started targeting
inflation. For that break, New Zealand and Australia show declines in the variance of the
10-year interest rate that exceed other inflation targeters in our sample.
8. These macroeconomic variables are also subject to innovations caused by real shocks. The
effects of these are not clearly affected by the change in policy regime.
































9. The analysis does not extend to possible changes in the underlying error processes for the
shocks and therefore to the sources of risk (or term) premia in long-term rates. Wright (2011)
constructs a data set and examines term premia for 10 countries, including Australia and New
Zealand, for the post-1990 period. He finds term premia to have declined globally and attrib-
utes the decline in part to ‘declining inflationary uncertainty amid substantial changes in mon-
etary policy frameworks of several central banks’ (p. 1515). Bauer, Rudebusch and Wu
(2014) reach somewhat different conclusions using the same data though they still find term
premia declining, Wright (2014) replies.
10. The exchange rate and commodity price variables were included to control for shocks that
affect interest rates in addition to monetary policy. The selection of commodity prices rather
than consumer prices is due to the unavailability of monthly data for the consumer price index
for both countries for our sample period. Commodity prices are highly correlated with con-
sumer prices. The correlation coefficients (quarterly log-levels) for Australia and New Zea-
land are 0.98 and 0.66, respectively, for the whole sample.
11. To save space, we do not include tables of unit root tests.
12. The test was originally proposed in Chow (1960). For the application to VARs, see Canova
(2007).
13. The VAR specifications were also estimated with a time trend included. The pattern of
impulse responses is robust to this change.
14. Confidence bands for the estimated impulse responses are calculated using a bootstrap method
of 2000 draws to compute the standard errors.
15. The level of significance is 5% throughout the analysis of impulse response functions.
16. The effect on the commodity price index for a small country such as New Zealand would be
expected to be only via the effect on the exchange rate. The positive effect is consistent with
the negative effect on the exchange rate. Still both the effects are counter intuitive. Both reflect
the ‘exchange rate puzzle’ as discussed in Kim and Roubini (2000) and Chen and Rogoff
(2002).
17. Data for the 2-year interest rate for Australia do not go far enough back to estimate the VAR
for the pre-inflation targeting period. Thus, the 1£1 cell in Figure 4 is blank.
18. A specific comparison is to results from VAR analyses for the United States summarized in
Berument and Froyen (2009, Table 1). An update of these estimates to provide evidence on
changing responses of long-term rates to change in the federal funds rate is precluded by the fact
that since December 2008 the target federal fund rate has been at the effective lower bound of
0.25%.
19. An interbank rate futures market does exist for Australia. The data does not extend far enough
back for our purposes. Moreover, that approach would complicate comparisons to the New
Zealand experience. Smales (2012) investigates the response of interest rate futures to Reserve
Bank of Australia target rate announcements for the period 20042010.
20. See Guender and Rimer (2008) for a detailed description of the Reserve Bank’s procedures.
21. Note that the policy variable here is the official cash rate rather than the actual overnight cash
rate. Discrete policy changes are changes in that rate. Definitions and data sources for all inter-
est rates are given in Table 6.
22. These sample periods are chosen for purposes of comparison with New Zealand. Estimates
that begin with the adoption of inflation targeting in October 1994 have quite similar implica-
tions to those in Table 5.
23. In the case of Australia, these effects also lose statistical significance at longer terms to maturity.
24. The Federal Reserve announces changes in the target federal funds rate in the early afternoon
before the bond markets close. Therefore, here the changes in the market rates are from day
(t  1) to (t), when t is the date of the target rate change. The sample period for the United
States in Table 5 ends in August 2008 for purposes of comparison. If the sample is extended
to December of 2008 when the federal funds rate hits the effective zero bound, the responses
of longer term interest rates are higher. They are still lower than in Australia or New Zealand
for 2-, 5- and 10-year rates.
25. Swiston (2007); Table 1) studies the United States for the period March 2000June 2006
using the method of Kuttner (2001) which relies on data from the federal funds futures market
to measure unanticipated changes in the federal funds target rate. His estimates of the effect
on longer term market interest rates of surprise changes in the policy rate are quite similar to
those in Table 5 (Panel C), especially for longer maturities.
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